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The “Will of the Voters”: Examining Trends in Legislative Repeal of State Ballot Initiatives 
By John W. Cronin, Advised by Dr. Stephen J. Farnsworth 
Political Science Major 





Direct democracy plays a significant role in 24 states across the country. 
The process of allowing the public to gather signatures, place an issue on 
the ballot, and then approve it represents the purest form of democracy and 
provides the ultimate check on unresponsive legislatures. However, in 
some cases ballot initiatives are repealed by state legislatures after being 
approved by voters. This research paper asks the following question: are 
there identifiable trends to the legislative repealing of direct ballot 
initiatives after they have been approved by the majority of the voting 
public? After considering past arguments and history surrounding 
initiatives, this paper observes five case studies that state legislatures tried 
to repeal. It finds that the legislature tends to using outside entities to 
justify repeal (blaming out-of-state groups and utilizing the judiciary), and 
that if repeal is taken up, total repeal bills are generally introduced first. It 
also observes that states with less rules surrounding legislative alteration 
will introduce repeal easier, and can apply “emergency clauses” to pass 
repeal bills with no possibility of voter referendum. Finally, it finds that 
the governor’s role in the repeal process is less about party and more about 
optics. This is distinct from the state legislature, whose members will 
usually side with their party even if their constituents hold the opposite 
opinion. Based on these trends this project proposes solutions— most 
notably increased oversight of emergency clauses and more voter 
awareness of the process. It also gives recommendations for future 
research in the subject.  
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On June 19th, 2018 voters in Washington D.C. approved “Initiative 77,” which proposed 
an increased minimum wage for tipped workers. Citizens put the measure on the ballot via a 
petition and the direct ballot initiative was approved by 55.7% of the D.C. voters at the polls.1 
However, Initiative 77 was blocked by the D.C. Council, which voted to repeal the measure on 
October 2nd, 2018.  
Taken at face value, the repealing of Initiative 77 hardly seems in line with America’s 
democracy. People complained that the D.C. legislators were “ignoring the will of the voters,”2 
and it would appear that they are right. However, this is hardly the first time a direct ballot 
initiative has been completely or partially repealed by its elected officials, and each time 
numerous discussions ensue. Even more recently, Idaho’s state legislature attempted to repeal a 
Medicaid initiative, and Utah’s state legislature succeeded in repealing a similar measure.3 While 
there are some regulations surrounding most states that have direct democracy written into their 
state constitution, 11 states do not have any restrictions on legislative alteration. Repealing the 
voters’ decisions deserves a closer examination.  
 In this research paper, I ask the following question: are there identifiable trends to the 
legislative repealing of direct ballot initiatives after they have been approved by the majority of 
the voting public? To answer this, I begin my paper by including a literature review, which 
examines the history, debates, and current regulations surrounding various components of ballot 
initiatives to set up my research. After that, I discuss the selection of data and variables. I then 
present five case studies of initiatives that had significant repeal attempts in the past 25 years, 
and use these examples to identify trends in my analysis section. Finally, I provide my 




Every state has ballot measures, which are questions that voters directly approve or deny. 
The type of ballot measure can vary based on what it is relating to and how it is placed on the 
ballot. Referrals are questions put forth by the state or local legislature. Initiatives are questions 
placed on the ballot via petitions by constituents. Finally, referendums allow the public to vote 
on current legislation, and are also put forth by the people. For my research, I look specifically at 
state ballot initiatives. These are statewide questions that were placed on the November ballots 
because supporters of the initiative collected enough signatures, and if the initiative is passed it 
becomes a state law.  
To understand the previous research surrounding this topic, this literature review will 
begin by analyzing the history of the debate over ballot initiatives, and then transition to the 
more recent arguments over the validity and purpose of ballot initiatives. It will then discuss the 
varying requirements to get an initiative on the ballot, and the legislative action that has taken 
place to regulate that process. Then, it will examine the existing rules on restricting (or not 
restricting) legislative action on ballot initiatives, while finally transitioning to the questions my 
research hopes to answer. 
 
History of the Ballot Initiative Debate in America 
The concept of ballot measures has been in the United States since the beginning of the 
country’s existence, with records of legislative referrals dating back to the American Revolution. 
It was during this early time of ballot measures that Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton 
were engaging in the debate over scope of power and public capacity that provided the 
foundation for the discussion today. Hamilton wanted a strong central government to create 
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order, which required the complete faith and support of the citizens of the nation. Jefferson on 
the other hand believed in a strong rural community, and was against too large a government 
because he saw it as a form of suppressing the freedom of the everyday man.4 Some New 
England colonies had history of utilizing town meetings to pass laws (and on the local level some 
of these meetings still occur today), but the establishment of a new country created a divide in 
the way to proceed with the direct democracy format. Jefferson and Hamilton established the two 
dominant ways of thinking, shaping the arguments that would evolve and continue to this day.  
In fact it was Jefferson who was one of the first to suggest a form of direct democracy 
when he recommended voter ratification of the proposed Virginia Constitution in 1775.5 Despite 
Jefferson’s proposal not reaching the Virginia delegates in time to be considered in the state 
constitutional convention, the idea began to spread around the country. Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire became the first states to succeed in holding a vote on their constitutions before the 
turn of the 19th century, and then the rest of the northern states like Rhode Island, Connecticut, 
Maine, and New York did the same.6 These states put their constitutions to voters for approval or 
disapproval, and provided clauses in their constitutions that required voter approval for any 
amendments to the constitutions after that.7 After that, most all states that entered the Union put 
their constitutions to the voters for approval, and in 1857 the U.S. Congress required voter 
approval of state constitutions.8 This was the first step in the process of increased voter 
involvement in state decision-making. 
 At this point however, voters would only be voting on legislative referrals. State 
legislatures would propose questions to the voters regarding amendments to state constitutions, 
and the voters could approve or deny. Statistics on early legislatively referred constitutional 
amendments are practically impossible to find, but research has detailed that voter referral 
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became the norm by the end of the nineteenth century.9 These referrals allowed for increased 
voter control of some issues, but overall the legislature still had control over what was put on the 
ballot. Despite this, an effect of the increased usage of legislative referrals was that voters began 
to understand the legislative process and their role in it.10 This allowed them to feel like they had 
some control, and that certain issues were meant for the voters themselves to directly decide.11  
After years of just voting on legislative referrals, a new concept proposed more power to 
the voters. The ballot initiative was introduced during the late 1800s and was a key part of the 
Progressive Era. Inspired by Switzerland’s direct democracy processes, initiatives were seen by 
Americans as a way to challenge the perceived lack of representation by Congress as well as the 
increased role of corporations and special interest groups in the political process.12 The Swiss 
had implemented their initiative system in the 1860s in large part due to the industrialization in 
their country.13 Now Americans were facing the same situation. Supporters of initiatives saw an 
opportunity to return the country to its roots of “New England town meetings” and bring about 
“peaceful political revolution.”14 This message gained support from notable individuals like 
Samuel Gompers of the American Federation of Labor. Gompers began touting the potential 
benefits in his speeches about initiative and referendum because he believed it was a peaceful 
way to achieve his union objectives as opposed to the violent and costly strikes that had been 
occurring. Gompers’ influence caused union groups to lead the charge for the implementation of 
initiative, increasing its popularity in the country’s minds.15  
Another influential leader in the movement was Eltweed Pomeroy. As a chief partner at a 
manufacturing firm, he was able to travel the country advocating for change. He praised 
Switzerland’s model and made his ultimate goal to form a “cooperative commonwealth.”16 
Pomeroy was radical in his views, believing that representative democracy overall was a failure 
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and plagued with corruption.17 He, and many other Populists at the time, saw the economic and 
social inequalities of the time as consequences from the general public being left out of decision-
making.18 They labelled representative democracy as antiquated, and saw a system of initiative 
and referendum as the solution to the problems of the time. Some research claims that the 
separation of the pro-initiative “moral crusaders” and the “corrupt politicians” is an unfair 
picture of the Gilded Age, and that the machine politics of the time were potentially 
exaggerated.19 Nevertheless, the perception was there during the 1890s that the game was rigged, 
and it strengthened the movement across the nation. The issue of initiatives was starting to be put 
in front of extremely hesitant legislatures, and the debate between the two sides began.  
As the turn of the twentieth century approached, Pomeroy and other advocates saw the 
support growing, and began to formalize their efforts. The reform movement became more 
organized, as many smaller groups saw this as an opportunity to have their voices heard. By 
largely claiming non-partisan affiliation, the movement brought Populists, unions, 
prohibitionists, single taxers, and Progressive members from both parties to collaborate for the 
cause of direct democracy.20 Many of these groups had different opinions about the value of 
initiatives and how they were going to utilize them to their advantage, but all together they 
created a strong base that was centered around the cause.21 Beginning in New Jersey and 
Massachusetts, “Direct Democracy Leagues” in the mid-1890s demanded for direct legislation 
principles to be accepted in party platforms and amended to state constitutions. While the 
mainstream newspapers did not cover the direct democracy movement, Pomeroy in 1894 created 
the Direct Legislation Record to report on the various campaigns that had begun around the 
nation in states like South Dakota, Oregon, and Kansas. Running until Pomeroy’s retirement in 
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1904, this again increased awareness of the issue, and gave the reform leaders a platform to 
spread their views.22  
At first, these proposals were not accepted by the existing legislatures of either party that 
they were brought before.23 Both parties had cases made to them during the 1896 presidential 
election season, but both were rejected on a national scale by nominees and party conventions.24 
However, during the next four years, with Republicans in control of much of the states outside 
the South, Democrats saw this as an opportunity to attack.25 Democratic parties in these Midwest 
and Western states to begin to endorse direct democracy as a way to negatively portray the 
Republicans as corrupt. Because of this power dynamic, the Democrats became the party the 
National Direct Legislation League (NDLL) would eventually utilize for reform, while the 
Republicans remained skeptical.26  
While the pro-initiative crowd touted a more democratic process reminiscent of town 
halls, the opposition saw these as impractical returns to less-effective ways of governing.27 
Opponents cited the U.S. Constitution as proof that initiatives violated the foundations of the 
nation—going against the representative democracy and checks and balances to limit an 
overwhelming power of a majority. They also saw the system as vulnerable to abuse by well-
organized minority groups that would impose an issue onto voters without careful deliberation 
like the Founders had intended.28 As I will examine later in the literature review, this line of 
logic is still part of the debate.  
The league intensified their efforts and created the NDLL in 1896, which oversaw 
campaign efforts all over the country and converted direct democracy to a mainstream political 
talking point.29 While the national campaign failed for numerous reasons, the battle for the states 
proved more successful, as the strong Populist sentiments of the Midwest and Western farmers 
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led to change. In 1897, Nebraska allowed for its cities to adopt initiative and referendum, and in 
1898 South Dakota became the first state to have the process written into its state constitution. 
Similar to Jefferson’s original argument in favor of the independence and self-sufficiency of the 
rural farmer, the belief in from the Populist farmers in the Midwest and Western states was that 
direct democracy would allow them to control their own destiny and create policies that 
benefitted them.30 Utah and Oregon were the next two states to pass amendments allowing for 
direct democracy during 1900-1902. A backlash did occur, with opponents challenging 
initiatives in Oregon in court. However, the legitimacy of direct democracy was upheld in every 
court all the way up to the Supreme Court, which in 1912 dismissed the issue as outside the 
purview of the court.31 By that time, 19 other states had already adopted initiative processes, and 
with the Supreme Court’s ruling, the constitutionality of the matter was settled.32 This meant that 
for the states that adopted, ballot initiatives were here to stay as a viable part of the political 
process.  
In all, 24 states ended up changing their states constitutions to allow some elements of 
direct democracy. Some states even entered the union with direct democracy in their 
constitutions (New Mexico’s original constitution in 1911 included a process for referendum, 
and Alaska’s in 1956 included initiatives).33 But in some states the popularity among voters did 
not translate to their state legislatures. Illinois took two non-binding advisory votes on the matter 
in 1902 and 1910. The voters overwhelmingly approved the proposal each time, but it was not 
until 1970 that Illinois passed an initiative process. Delaware also held an advisory vote on a 
referendum process in 1906, but the state legislature did not listen when voters approved the 
mandate and has not even implemented voter approval of constitutional amendments to this day. 
Michigan voters passed initiative and referendum in 1908, but the original process was very 
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confusing and difficult for them to place legislation on the ballot. It wasn’t until 1913 that the 
state approved an easier method. Other states had have trouble with the voting process. 
Wyoming and Mississippi voters both approved direct democracy processes in 1912, but because 
their state constitutions required for a majority of all votes, and not just those on the amendment 
itself, blank votes were counted as “no’s” and the amendment failed. Amendments in the two 
states finally passed in 1914 for Mississippi and 1968 for Wyoming. Minnesota had the same 
provision for blank votes counted as no in its constitution, leading to failed votes in 1914, 1916, 
and 1980, and has not implemented direct democracy.34  
After the initial excitement around ballot initiatives in the early part of the century, direct 
democracy was used less frequently until the late 1960s.35 Until the Vietnam War era, trust in the 
government was higher, and initiatives were seen as “relics” of a different era. The initiative 
revival had to do with the decreased trust in government that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s.36 
The period from 1977 to 1996 saw a 164% increase in the average amount of initiatives during a 
four-year election cycle.37 This surge, continuing to today, brought up old debates, and spawned 
new ones.  
 
The Contemporary Debate- Voter Competence 
Today 24 states, plus Washington D.C., permit citizen-led ballot initiatives. But there is 
still controversy and pushback against them. Much research has been done on the impacts and 
legalities that ballot measures have had, and continue to have, on our political process. This has 
allowed each side of the debate to be well-equipped with ammunition for their respective 
viewpoint. As ballot initiatives continue to be utilized for various issues in the country, the 
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questions surrounding them are essential to how America defines its democracy and how 
important issues are addressed in areas of the country.  
A main question is whether voters are well-informed enough to change law in a state. 
This is important because there is a split in the intentions of the initiative movement that some 
researchers have identified as having influenced the process today. Populists saw initiatives as 
how the people could be in complete control, in place of a corrupt government, while 
Progressives saw them more as checks on power than a means to replace a representative style.38 
While the original days saw the groups fighting together for legalizing direct democracy, both 
ideologies are now at odds with the future of the initiative, and this split draws scrutiny to how 
much responsibility voters should have.  
Proponents of ballot initiatives will turn to studies that say that direct democracy 
increases political participation because of the higher turnout for non-presidential election years. 
Presidential elections usually see less initiatives come to the ballot because much more attention 
is put on the presidential candidates and the parties try not to divide over an issue raised in a 
measure.39 The presence of ballot initiatives generally increases turnout in midterm elections, as 
certain key issues like marijuana and Medicaid generally motivate certain voters to come to the 
polls.40 While the positive impact on turnout is not widely disputed, voters’ understanding of the 
issue presented is. Some studies have shown that voters from states that utilize larger amounts of 
initiatives improve their political knowledge over a long period of time.41 However, there is 
research on the other side that sees any knowledge increase as modest, and therefore not 
significant enough to credit direct democracy as the reason.42 This is an important question 
because when debating the initiatives’ impacts on society, if true, fostering a more politically 
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active and knowledgeable voting population would be a major point for proponents to use in 
their argument. 
Before going to the polls, opponents question voter awareness on initiatives on the ballot. 
If initiatives are not publicized by the media, or do not have a lot of spending on their behalf, 
then voters are less likely to be aware of them, and therefore less knowledgeable about what they 
are voting on.43 Certain divisive issues like gay marriage are much more likely to get attention 
because of these factors, while initiatives that deal with less-appealing issues like taxes or small-
business regulations struggle to gain people’s attention.44 In addition, states that overload their 
voters with initiatives on the ballot can create voter fatigue, which decreases the likelihood that 
voters will want to study and learn about all the different issues that they face.45  
Another reason voters can be negatively impacted on election day is the confusing 
language of the initiatives themselves. This has become such a noticeable problem for voters in 
the initiative states that readability scores have been assigned to each ballot measure based on the 
syllables, words, and sentences in the measure.46 According to Ballotpedia and the Flesch-
Kincaid Grade Level formula, in 2018 the average question on the ballot (which included 
referrals, initiatives, and referendums) required between 19 or 20 years of U.S. formal 
education.47 When looking at the education statistics in the country, this means that only 8 to 9 
percent of the U.S. population can completely grasp the average ballot measure.48 Summaries 
and explanations meant to assist voters in their decision are marginally better, but still required 
on average 16 years of formal education to understand.49 Research has shown that based on the 
difficulty of interpreting a question on the ballot, voters will skip voting on certain measures that 
they find too hard to read.50 Beyond that, there is concern that if some initiatives are too 
complex, voters will vote no on an initiative, therefore not providing an informed vote.51  
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 All of these variables can impact voter competency on ballot initiatives, and are reasons 
opponents use to demonstrate the unreliability of the results of initiative elections. Proponents 
advocate that the people deciding is a more democratic process than the government because of 
less corruption and a more honest look at what the people care about. Opponents state that 
representative democracy is in place for a reason, as a typical voter might not be aware, or not 
have the ability to comprehend an initiative. However, voters might not necessarily be the 
problem with the direct democracy process.52 Proponents advocate that voters will typically not 
vote on issues that are not in their personal best interests, despite what opponents claim. While 
many can get overwhelmed by various parts of the process, some polls have shown that people 
enjoy the concept of direct democracy in their state and value it.53 Therefore, while debates over 
voter competency are relevant, they are not unanimously accepted as the only reason that ballot 
initiatives are controversial. There are other issues at play.  
 
The Contemporary Debate- Majority Tyranny 
Direct democracy has traditionally been seen as a way to subvert an unresponsive 
government that does not speak for the people. When first implemented, minority groups like 
prohibitionists, woman suffragists, and labor unions utilized them as way to get their issues on 
the ballot through signatures, which had been blocked or ignored by the states up until then.54 
However, a major topic in the initiative debate has been how they can be abused by the majority. 
The argument that this directly conflicts with the Founders’ vision of America, and with 
representative democracy, is prevalent, as opponents argue that initiatives are less democratic. 
Their reasoning is that initiatives do not allow for refinement of ideas or for intelligent 
deliberation of issues.55 Furthermore, initiatives are decided at the polls by a simple majority, 
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which strays away from compromise. America’s representative system, complete with checks 
and balances was put in place to limit the concentration of power.56 Opponents cite the potential 
abuse as why initiatives are dangerous.  
Unfortunately, there have been examples of ballot initiative abuse throughout American 
history. In certain instances, initiatives have resulted in discrimination against minority 
communities, such as banning gay marriage, cancelling affirmative action programs, and stalling 
school desegregation plans.57 Research has found that whether placed on the ballot by supporters 
or opponents of a civil rights cause, when put to a popular vote the minority communities are at 
risk because of the lack of representative filter.58 It has also sadly been proven that initiative is 
usually not effective in extending minority rights, as nearly 90% of the time, the minority group 
has lost these types of questions, no matter which side put them on the ballot.59 In addition, 
initiatives that have looked to restrict minorities have traditionally been more likely to succeed.60  
Today’s America is not like it was in the 1960s or 1970s, but initiatives are still not an 
effective way for minority voices to be heard. While the Supreme Court has not explicitly stated 
that initiatives repealing civil rights are unconstitutional, they have ruled several times against 
initiatives that restrict minorities in the political process.61 This is encouraging, but still does not 
instill confidence for minorities in the system. Overall, initiatives have too many examples of 
restricting minorities to demonstrate a new system of government. This is important and 
demonstrates the need for some control of the process, and represents how the current consensus 
on responsible initiative use favors the Progressivist viewpoint of them being checks on an 
unresponsive government as opposed to replacing representative democracy.  
  
The Contemporary Debate- The Business of Initiatives 
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Another developing issue throughout the years is the business side of ballot initiatives. 
The concept of everyday citizens rallying up their peers to get enough signatures to place an 
issue on a ballot is becoming less common in the face of special interest groups utilizing the 
initiative process to further their policy goals. Some see this phenomena as a good thing, creating 
a more organized system to get issues on the ballot. Others see this as an out of control business 
that threatens America’s democracy.62  
As with most aspects of the political world, the cost of initiative campaigns is rising each 
year. While 2017 saw only four citizen initiatives put on state ballots, only one support campaign 
raised less than $10 million, and an opposition campaign in Ohio generated $59 million in 
contributions.63 The 63 citizen initiatives in 2018 accounted for more than 80 percent of the 
$1.185 billion campaign contributions, with total contributions reaching over $100 million in 
some cases.64 Some see interest groups as the problem, as the millions spent on advertising 
creates an increased reliance on capital in the initiative process.65 Others have stated that more 
money in an initiative campaign makes the public more aware, and allows them to vote based on 
their ideology as opposed to a random “no” vote.66 Research has shown that outspending an 
opponent on a ballot measure campaign increases the likelihood of success.67 Because of the 
increased reliance on finances, it has become the norm in nearly all initiative campaigns to pay 
signature collectors, which has opponents saying that this is buying the vote.68 Proponents will 
point to paid signature gatherers as being more effective at doing their job, as there is a monetary 
motivator.69 However, this puts larger, more financially equipped groups at an advantage over 
others, and allows them to get initiatives on ballots easier.70 Overall, the increased influence of 
money in the initiative process is an unintended consequence of the “pure” process of direct 
democracy.71 A concept started by groups that were anxious to eliminate corporate power in the 
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political process ended up creating a system where interest groups and powerful individuals still 
have a great influence.72 
This influence extends beyond the monetary aspect, as the political game of initiatives is 
apparent in how some are placed on a ballot. Interest groups will look to initiatives if the 
legislative process has proven too difficult, sometimes to generate media attention to their 
issue.73 In addition, the concept of a “counter-initiative” can be utilized by groups that want to 
nullify an existing proposition on the ballot.74 By creating an initiative that is similar to ones 
already on the ballot but with minor changes, businesses can confuse voters so that they just vote 
no to every initiative on the ballot.75 Leveraging ballot initiatives for their own gain is how 
businesses can get around the legislature, or shoot down an opponent group. Opponents argue 
that this is inherently wrong and that it, and many other aspects of the initiative process should 
be reformed.  
Reform Recommendations and Legislation 
In December 2001, the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) assembled a 
task force to “review the growing use of initiatives and referendums around the country and to 
examine their effect on representative democracy as a whole.”76 They expressed concern over 
too much special interest involvement, and recommended drafting, certification, signature-
gathering, and financial disclosure reform. They also advocated for initiatives to only be allowed 
on general election ballots.77 Many of these recommendations are already implemented, but only 
in certain states. This is where the debate over ballot initiatives can most notably be seen, as the 
battle between state legislatures and initiative advocacy groups have made regulation rules 
different across the country. Through examination of the regulation efforts, one can learn about 
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each state’s unique process for getting an initiative on the ballot, as well as what stands in an 
initiative’s way.  
One of the most common regulations is on initiative subject. These can either limit the 
amount of issues that can be addressed at once, or restrict what topics can be covered overall.78 
Depending on the state, proposals concerning topics like religion, judiciary, or even the initiative 
process itself are subject to restriction. Other states do not have the same restrictions but make 
petitioners detail their sources of funding before allowing the ballot to be campaigned.79 Single-
subject rules are implemented so that proponents of an initiative cannot “logroll” several 
unrelated issues into a single initiative.80 However, that has not stopped petitioners from 
continuing to push the boundaries of what an initiative does. “Distributive logrolling” has 
emerged as an option for groups to get around the single subject laws by making an initiative 
about funding which goes toward several different projects.81 This creates coalitions between 
groups to pass omnibus-like spending proposals, which they use to gain more signatures and 
more support on election day.82 In addition, several states require “sponsors” signatures before 
an initiative can even be considered official. Further signature requirements are implemented for 
then placing initiatives on the ballots. These regulate how many signatures are needed, the 
deadlines to turn them in, and verification. The number of signatures needed is usually a 
percentage of the number of votes cast in a previous election.83  
 While many of these regulations were put in place to manage the process of putting 
initiatives on the ballot in efficient ways, proponents have said that this makes the process harder 
and is potentially unconstitutional.84 Some opponents have argued that they do not go far 
enough.85 However, both sides agree that voter awareness is an issue that can and needs to be 
addressed. The NCSL report described the importance of voter education, and recommended that 
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states provide pamphlets and engage the public to ensure issue awareness increases.86 In the 
context of this paper, voter education is important not just because it allows voters to make an 
informed choice on election day, but also because voter awareness of the rules surrounding the 
initiative process can potentially allow for more legislative accountability and oversight.   
 
Rules on Legislative Repealing of Ballot Initiatives  
Just as some state legislatures have made rules on the initiative process, some laws have 
been implemented to limit a legislature’s repeal power. And just like putting an initiative on the 
ballot, the nullification of one differs from state to state. There are a few commonalities in 
restrictions on legislative alteration that can be broken down into three distinct categories. One is 
passage of time restrictions, meaning that some states have periods which the state legislatures 
cannot amend or repeal an initiative. The length of time varies in the five states that have this 
restriction in their constitutions. The time period that is restricted is two years in Alaska, 
Washington, and Wyoming, three years in Nevada, and seven years in North Dakota.87 All of 
these states restrict immediate repeal, but adding an amendment to an initiative can occur 
immediately in Alaska and Wyoming. This represents one way in which those state legislatures 
could get around the restriction if they desired.  
North Dakota and Washington both combine the passage of time restriction with a 
supermajority restriction. This process allows the state legislatures to repeal or amend an 
initiative, but only by at least a 2/3 majority vote in both chambers. Along with North Dakota 
and Washington, Nebraska and Arkansas require a 2/3 majority vote. Arizona and Michigan 
require even more than those states with a 3/4 majority vote.88 This forces the legislature to come 
to more of a consensus when it comes to completely or partially repealing an initiative. While it 
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might not prove a challenge for some states that have one-party control, it still provides a slight 
check on the legislature’s ability to strike down initiatives they do not agree with.  
Finally, in California and Arizona, any proposed changes to a ballot initiative must be put 
back to the voters for them to decide.89 This requirement puts most all of the control in the hands 
of the voters, as the only way that a legislature can repeal or amend an initiative is if they place a 
new measure before the public via a legislative referral. While only those two states have that 
option, this is by far the most restrictive on the legislature.  
However, 11 states (Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah) and D.C. have no laws governing against legislative 
alteration.90 This means that representatives in these states can repeal or alter ballot initiatives 
immediately, with a simple majority vote, and without any voter input. In addition to the lack of 
rules, the legislatures can use methods to prevent voters from holding referendums on passed 
bills. The most common are exemptions against referendums that deal with laws concerning state 
fiscal matters, or have an “emergency clause” attached.91 When placed on a bill, the emergency 
clause puts it immediately into effect and prevents the voters from holding a referendum on it.  
All of the states that have referendum written into their constitutions have some sort of 
limitation on that referendum, and the emergency clause has been controversial because of its 
broad interpretation.92 According to several court decisions in the early 20th century on the issue, 
the choice to declare an emergency was originally completely up to the legislature and not 
subject to judicial review.93 Other court opinions have brought the issue back to a debate, but 
regardless there is still tremendous power in the legislature’s ability to restrict access to 
referendums.94 The usage rate of emergency clauses is high in some states, and has shown no 
signs of slowing down.95 This suggests misuse of the emergency clause on the part of legislators, 
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as if they know they can deem any bill a matter of public safety, then they can effectively shut 
down any public response on it.   
In no state does the governor have veto power over passed initiatives, so the power to 
repeal an initiative lies with the judiciary and the legislature. The courts will strike down 
unconstitutional initiatives when they appear, and that process is separate from the research I will 
be doing. However, the legislative side of repealing ballot initiatives is one that has yet to have 
much research conducted on it. With all of the contemporary protest and distrust in America’s 
political representatives, it remains a question whether citizens should be worried about elected 
officials reversing decisions made by constituents. The repeal process is imperfect, and not 
standardized, but if there are tendencies in it, that could change how initiatives are seen on the 
ballot and how closely they are monitored after approval. I aim to identify these tendencies in the 
following case studies and analysis.  
 
Methodology 
 Finding suitable cases to study was a very important task for this research, and therefore I 
implemented clear guidelines for my search. First, all ballot measures being examined had to be 
direct initiatives. This means they could not come from states where initiatives go through the 
legislature for approval to be placed on the ballot. I did this to isolate the purest form of direct 
democracy that America has, free from any legislative action on the initiative before the voters 
have their say. I also only analyzed state-level ballot initiatives because while there are many 
more examples in local elections, I wanted to keep the government level of each initiative 
constant.  
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 Another constant in my research involved the distinction between initiated state statutes 
and initiated constitutional amendments. While there are direct forms of both types, the process 
of overturning constitutional amendments is much more complicated since different states have 
different rules for that procedure. It is a much easier and standardized process for state 
legislatures to overturn state statutes because they can pass laws and receive gubernatorial 
approval as opposed to revising their state constitution. For those reasons, I decided that to keep 
my case studies consistent by only observing initiated state statutes. Given these parameters, my 
search was limited to 14 states.  
After limiting my scope, I transitioned to case selection. Finding cases that fit the 
parameters proved initially difficult. Some media websites do not archive their stories and a lot 
of information I was searching for was not stored on government websites. There is not a 
database of initiatives that have been repealed, so finding each was a unique search. Part of what 
qualified a case for me to analyze was the volume of information that was available on it. Certain 
cases could have been selected, but there was not enough information on them either because of 
poor recordkeeping or lack of information originally published. For example, Utah’s 2018 
Propositions 2 and 3 were not case studies because they were still ongoing repeal processes when 
I was writing this paper, in addition to the fact that since they were so current there would not be 
enough time to analyze the impact repeal had on the initiative movement.  
Again, since information on repeal is difficult to find, I had no feasible way of identifying 
initiatives that the public voted against which state representatives then created legislation for. 
These situations are important to the issues this paper presents since they are still going against 
the voters’ wishes, but could not be a part of the analysis.  
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All of the cases that I examine here were chosen because there was a significant repeal 
attempt by the respective state legislatures. I considered initiatives that legislatures repealed 
completely (South Dakota’s 2016 Measure 22 and Idaho’s 1994 Initiative 2) and repealed 
partially (Montana’s 2004 I-148, Missouri’s 2010 Proposition B and Proposition C).  
I utilized the political website Ballotpedia.org to get the basic information about 
initiatives and their results before exploring further. I used state websites to view official state 
documents. For my analysis, I focused on the time periods when the state legislatures were 
deliberating repeal. I paid attention to the actions that representatives took in that process, as well 
as relevant public statements. I closely followed the representatives whose actions went against 
the expressed preferences of their constituents, because if a member’s district voted against an 
initiative, then objecting lawmakers are not necessarily misrepresenting them. To do this, I 
utilized voting records and state congressional journals to identify how each representative acted 
on each bill. I also highly relied on local newspaper coverage of the timelines of repeal, as often 
members of the legislatures gave comments that allowed me to examine what they were telling 
their constituents. Newspapers also allowed me to initially find these measures, as the act of 
attempting to overturn the will of the voters is often controversial and is closely covered by the 
papers. By identifying which representatives were going against their constituents, and analyzing 
the timelines toward repeal, I was able to search for trends in the process to determine if there is 
a standard way that state legislatures look to repeal ballot initiatives.   
 
Case Studies 
Idaho Initiative 2, 1994 
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 The initiative is seldom used in Idaho, as there have only been 28 initiative questions on 
ballots since the state Constitution allowed for them in 1933.96 Despite a national movement for 
legislative term limits starting with California, Colorado, and Oklahoma, previous legislation to 
enact term limits in Idaho had largely failed.97 However, signature gatherers were finally able to 
get the issue on the ballot via an initiative in 1994. To get an initiative on the ballot in Idaho, the 
signatures must equal 6% of the number of registered voters at the time of the most recent 
general election.98 In the 1992 general election, there were 521,171 registered voters, which 
meant that 31,271 signatures were needed to get an initiative on the ballot.99 
Initiative 2 (also called Proposition 2) received enough signatures and was placed on the 
Idaho ballot in 1994. Its purpose was to establish term limits for federal, state, county, municipal 
and school district officials.100 Under the proposal, U.S. House of Representative members from 
the state would be limited to six years in office over an 11-year period and U.S. Senate members 
would be limited to 12 years over any 23-year period.101  
It was approved with a 18.70 point margin, with 234,703 (59.35%) voting for, and 
160,748 (40.65%) voting against. It passed in 36 out of the 44 counties in the state.102 Since the 
1995 U.S. Supreme Court case, U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, ruled that states could not 
place term limits on members of the U.S. Congress beyond those stated in the Constitution, those 
provisions of Initiative 2 were disregarded.103 This still left the term limits of state and local 
officials to eight years in office over any 15-year period, and county commissioners and school 
board members to six years of service over any 11-year period.104 These term limits were to be 
implemented beginning 10 years later in 2004.   
Idahoans for Term Limits was the largest supporter of the 1994 initiative campaign, with 
a large percentage of their donations coming from the national organization, U.S. Term 
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Limits.105 Overall, proponents spent a total of $942,000 on three successful initiatives on the 
ballot in 1994, 1996, 1998.106 All of them aimed at reforming Idaho’s electoral system through 
term limits. The 1996 initiative, accepted with 56.05% of the vote, instructed candidates for U.S. 
Congress and the state legislature to support congressional term limits and indicate non-support 
on the ballot.107 The 1998 initiative, approved with 54.66% of the vote, allowed congressional 
candidates to sign a term limits pledge and informed voters on the ballot if a candidate signs or 
breaks that pledge.108 With all these citizen-led statutes being accepted, the legislature soon 
began to search for ways to undue the original 1994 initiative that had started the term limits 
discussion for the state and local level. 
The dispute over Initiative 2 was immediate from many members of the state legislature, 
and it was not reserved for a single party. Republican Senate President Pro Tempore Mike Crapo 
expressed his concern that the initiative would have negative consequences for local elections, 
which caused fellow Republican U.S. Sen. Larry Craig to pull his previous support.109 The 
concern over local elections grew over time, as county clerks and sheriffs eventually would 
heavily support repeal efforts based on functional need in rural areas.110 On the other side, there 
were Republicans like Helen Chenoweth who supported term limits, while her Democrat 
opponent did not.111 Therefore, the issue was not completely partisan at the beginning, and since 
Idaho was a heavily Republican-controlled state, it would come down to the party’s stance in 
future years. At the Republican Party convention in 2000, a contentious debate ended with the 
passage of a platform opposing term limits by a vote of 162-155.112 This created a partisan divide 
over the issue that would only grow as the debate continued, as Democrats saw the Republican 
desire to potentially overturn the will of the voters as a way to gain political points in future 
elections.113 
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 The fight over term limits would increase further seven years after Initiative 2. In 2001, 
some legislators argued that Initiative 2 was unconstitutional, and successfully challenged that in 
Idaho’s 6th District Court in the case Rudeen v. Cenarrusa.114 Secretary of State Pete Cenarrusa, 
along with several other county, city and school district clerks were named as defendants in the 
case.115 The central argument against Initiative 2 was that the right of candidates to run for office 
was a fundamental right protected by the Idaho Constitution. The petitioners argued that this 
fundamental right was a right of suffrage, meaning that suffrage included the right to hold public 
office.116 The 6th district court ruled that Initiative 2 “unconstitutionally infringe[s] upon the 
fundamental right of suffrage that the Idaho Constitution guarantees,” which temporarily proved 
that argument valid for the legislators.117 
This decision was appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court by Cenarrusa and defendant-
intervenor Citizens for Term Limits later that year. The Idaho Supreme Court ruled unanimously 
to overturn that decision, upholding the constitutionality of Initiative 2’s term limits on state 
government officials.118 The court found that while the right to suffrage was extended beyond 
simply the right to vote, it did not encompass the right to hold office.119 This decision overturned 
the 6th district, but the court continued in their analysis to address another argument. This 
argument was made by the petitioners that stated Initiative 2 was discriminatory, and in violation 
of equal protection rights. The Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the concept of term limits was 
"rationally related" to the "legitimate government goal of giving more individuals the 
opportunity to hold government offices.”120 On this basis, the court concluded that Initiative 2 
did not violate the candidates' equal protection rights under the Federal or Idaho Constitution.121 
While this case did not result in the preferred outcome for the legislators that were against 
Initiative 2, it did provide a glimpse into their initial reasoning for repeal.  
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 Having the court strike it down would have absolved the legislators from much of the 
responsibility of eliminating Initiative 2. Since it did not, after the court’s ruling, Idaho’s state 
legislators decided to take matters into their own hands and began to draft repeal legislation. 
HB425 was brought to the Idaho House in January 2002, with the simple text and purpose of 
repealing the code that Initiative 2 had implemented.122 HB425 passed through the House with a 
vote of 50-20, and through the Senate 27-8.123 However, despite the Republican platform 
officially being against term limits, Republican Governor Dirk Kempthorne vetoed HB425. 
Kempthorne had been supportive of Initiative 2 from the beginning, and had left the 2000 
convention before the deciding platform vote had been taken.124 Kempthorne backed the original 
decision in his veto of the bill, saying “the will of the voters cannot be ignored and must be 
protected.”125  
 Just 24 hours after Kempthorne’s veto Idaho’s House and Senate held their supermajority 
vote to override it, with only one less “aye” than its original passage through both chambers (50-
20 in the House, 26-8-1 in the Senate).126 Legislators pleased with the outcome defended their 
repeal vote against the scrutiny that arose. Republican Speaker Bruce Newcomb cited out-of-
state money for influencing the voters, stating that Idaho was “a cheap state to buy” and that “it 
was not in the public interest.”127 Republican Doug Jones exclaimed that “If people don't like the 
way I vote, they should get rid of me.”128 Jones was a nine-term member at the time, which 
would have made him subject to the term limits sooner. But younger members explained their 
decisions as well. Freshman Republican legislator Eulalie Langford explained that her concern 
was over rural Idaho, and how since there are fewer people in the rural areas, term limits hurt 
local elected officials more. She and other representatives argued that term limits for the local 
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officials deprive the communities of experienced politicians and give them less influence in the 
areas they serve.129  
An analysis of these votes by Daniel A. Smith examined several variables that could have 
predicted the outcome based on the representative. Out of all the variables he tested, only 
political party and district type (urban or rural) had a statistically significant effect.130 The voting 
percentage of the representative’s district on Initiative 2 in 1994 and the number of terms a 
representative has served both were expected to have impacts on the vote. Smith expected 
representatives to agree with the way their constituents voted in 1994, and he expected the longer 
the tenure of a representative would increase the chances of support for repeal. However neither 
variable was statistically significant. In addition, the district’s competitiveness showed no major 
correlation, even though one might expect that if there was not a significant opponent who posed 
a threat, the representative could more easily go against the wishes of his or her district. The 
variables that did prove impactful were party and district type. If a representative was a 
Republican, they were very likely to vote for repeal. If the congressperson was representing a 
largely rural district, they were also likely to want to overturn Initiative 2.131  
  The backlash was apparent after the passage of HB425, with some incumbents losing 
primary bids, and a voter referendum being placed on the ballot.132 This referendum was citizen-
driven, and concerned the acceptance or rejection of HB425. The result of the referendum was 
not what proponents of Initiative 2 wanted, as the voters of Idaho narrowly elected to accept 
HB425 as law with 50.2% of the vote.133 There was some speculation that the wording of the 
referendum was confusing to voters, causing them to select the wrong option, but others believe 
that it was because the meaning to rural voters resonated just enough with them to support 
HB425.134 Here is the text of the long-form ballot title below: 
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Rejection of H425, by this referendum will enact ballot access restrictions that will have 
the practical effect of imposing term limits on state elected officeholders, state legislative 
elected officeholders, county elected officeholders, and municipal elected officeholders 
and school board members.135 
 
 The initiative campaign never got back to its former support, which represents a win for 
incumbents in the Idaho legislature. Citizens of the state utilized the initiative process and 
implemented term limits all the way down to the local level, but lawmakers were able to repeal 
the measure without any long term backlash.136 While first trying to utilize the courts to strike 
down Initiative 2, drafting and passing a bill proved to not be difficult because of the willingness 
of the members to vote with their party. While the impact on rural representatives was definitely 
a factor, this example showcases some key tactics legislatures use to attempt repeal, and 
demonstrates how the political party of a representative can have a substantial impact on the 
decision to repeal.  
 
Montana I-148, 2004 
 Marijuana has been a very popular initiative topic in the past 20 years. Between 1972 and 
the end of 2017, 14 states legalized medical marijuana via a statewide ballot measure.137 In 2004, 
Montana joined the trend by gaining the required signatures to get I-148 on the ballot. In 
Montana, the signatures required to place an initiated state statute on the ballot are to equal five 
percent of the votes cast for governor in the most recent gubernatorial election.138 Since 410,192 
people voted in the 2000 gubernatorial election, 20,507 signatures were needed.139 
 I-148 legalized the “production, possession, and use of marijuana by patients with 
debilitating medical conditions.”140 These conditions included those resulting from cancer, 
glaucoma, or HIV/AIDS. It also allowed for some leeway by providing for other conditions that 
the state could define beyond those of severe or chronic pain, severe nausea, seizures, and 
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muscles spasms.141 The initiative would allow for the patient or the patient’s caregiver to grow or 
possess “limited amounts of marijuana” by showing the state a doctor’s note that described them 
as having a condition that would benefit from the use of marijuana. The official ballot language 
stated that there would be “no measurable cost” for the state if I-148 was approved by the 
voters.142  
 The initiative was approved by a wide margin of 23.62 percentage points, with 276,042 
people voting in favor (61.81%), and 170,579 (38.19%) voting against.143 47 out of 56 counties 
voted in favor of the measure.144 At the time, this was the second-largest margin of victory for a 
medical marijuana ballot measure.145 The Medical Marijuana Policy Project of Montana 
(MMPMM) donated $555,082 in support of the initiative.146 There is no record of donations in 
opposition of the initiative.147 
 To go along with the national debate over marijuana at the time, the two sides in 
disagreement over the initiative followed much of the same arguments that the rest of the country 
was making. The official proponent argument was made by Democratic Representative Ron 
Erickson, Paul Befumo of MMPMM, and a Montanan named Robin Prosser, who had personally 
used marijuana to treat chronic pain due to an immunosuppressive illness.148 The opposition 
argument was made by Republican Representative Jim Shockley, and Roger Curtis, president of 
the Association for Addiction Professionals.149 The health benefits of marijuana were a key 
divider, as proponents of I-148 cited the American Nurses Association, the American Public 
Health Association, and the American Academy of Family Physicians as organizations that had 
declared support for the benefits of medical marijuana. The opponents of I-148 disputed the 
positive benefits of marijuana, iterating that legalization advocates were attempting to confuse 
the people about marijuana and already approved drugs like Marinol (which can be used to treat 
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nausea in cancer patients or treat loss of appetite).150 They also mentioned that the respiratory 
problems associated with smoking the plant could outweigh benefits, despite the fact that there 
are several other ways to ingest the substance.151  
Beyond the health argument, both sides examined the current policies around the nation 
regarding medical marijuana to make their cases. Opponents pointed to the current federal stance 
that designated marijuana as a Schedule 1 drug with dangerous side effects as reasoning for 
keeping the current rules. They stated that even if Montana legalized the use of medical 
marijuana in the state, the federal government prohibited the growth or use of it. Proponents of I-
148 advocated that legalization would allow patients to not have to worry about facing 
punishment for seeking out treatment.152 The state law at the time saw users of marijuana in 
Montana be subject to up to six months in prison and a $500 fine.153 Proponents also detailed that 
I-148 was similar to laws in nine other states, so there was precedent for the initiative. Based on 
a study of those states, proponents stated that the health benefits were real, and that there was no 
burden on law enforcement.154 
Despite open disagreement from some state representatives, no immediate legislative 
action was taken on I-148. This is most likely due to its high support among citizens in 2004, and 
the federal rules that prevented widespread usage in the state. However, in 2009, the U.S. Justice 
Department said that that prosecution of medical marijuana users would not be a priority in states 
where legalization had occurred.155 This loosening of federal oversight significantly increased 
the number of medical marijuana cardholders in Montana, rising from 3,921 to approximately 
30,000 in 2011.156 It also saw dispensaries increase from 1,403 to 4,848.157 In response to this 
increase, critics of I-148 began to allege problems with the medical marijuana system of the 
state. They reported caravans signing people up around the state, along with sign-offs on 
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marijuana cards by doctors that only required extremely short visits.158 This strengthened the 
anti-marijuana interest groups and legislators in Montana to take action.   
 The repeal effort began with the introduction of HB161 in January 2011. The proposed 
bill was introduced by Republican Representative and Speaker of the House, Mike Milburn, 
whose district voted in favor of I-148 in 2004.159 In reaction to the growing number of users in 
the state, Milburn called the situation “a totally uncontrolled epidemic,” and that it was “time to 
take back the state and its culture.”160 HB161 aimed to completely repeal I-148 from the 
Montana code.161 While proponents like Milburn and many other Montana Republicans talked 
about the danger and potential for corruption that the current policy could have, Democratic 
opponents questioned why a full repeal was necessary. House Representatives Diane Sands (D) 
and Pat Noonan (D) expressed concern over repealing a voter initiative, citing that any problems 
that had arisen were not the voters’ fault, and instead should be on the state to regulate. They 
pointed to compromise legislation that could help curb the issues like concerns over illegitimate 
signups or illegal activity while also recognizing that marijuana was a part of the community.162  
Despite Democrat efforts, HB161 passed through the Montana House 63-37, and then 
through the Senate 28-22.163 The votes were almost exclusively along party lines, with 
Republicans in favor and Democrats opposed. No Democrat in the House supported the 
legislation, and only one Senate Democrat voted in favor. Six Republicans voted against HB161 
in the House, and one Republican voted against it in the Senate.164 The one Democrat who 
supported the measure was Sen. Larry Jent. While he never gave reasoning other than moral 
opposition on legalizing the drug, in his run for State Attorney General in 2016 Jent expressed 
regret for voting for repeal and said he has changed his stance on medical marijuana.165 Besides 
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the outliers, this suggests that loyalty to party or personal values were more important than 
catering to the original wishes of the constituents.  
HB161 was then put on Democratic Governor Brian Schweitzer’s desk for approval. This 
would have made Montana the first out of the 15 states that had enacted medical marijuana laws 
to then decide to repeal them.166 However, following the logic of other Montana Democrats, 
Governor Schweitzer vetoed HB161, stating that it was draconian to go against the wishes of the 
voters, and that regulation of the industry was the way to proceed.167 He pointed toward existing 
proposed legislation as measures that he would potentially support.168 This ended the effort for 
total repeal of I-148, and shifted the legislature’s focus onto bills that dealt with partial repeal.  
The bill that they ended up passing was SB423, which placed several provisions on the 
cultivation, manufacturing, possession, and use of medical marijuana. The bill required patients 
to have more clearly defined symptoms, changing the term “severe” to “intractable,” requiring 
patients with serious diseases like cancer to be symptomatic, and requiring those applying not to 
be on probation or parole.169 It also required that patients carry their cards and provide the card 
and photo identification if requested by law enforcement or a court.170 Regulations on physicians 
included restrictions on using telemedicine to give cards, accepting or soliciting a certain 
provider, and performing evaluations at places where marijuana was cultivated or 
manufactured.171 The bill also required physicians to include various statements in their written 
certificates. Physicians would now have to detail the patient’s disease, that other options had 
been discussed, and that they would manage and monitor the patient’s treatment and 
condition.172 SB423 changed the terminology of the person growing the marijuana from 
“caregiver” to “provider” and limited the number of people to whom they could give marijuana 
to three (however, of those three people, two had to be relatives).173 In addition, the bill made 
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providers ineligible to be paid for their service.174 Further provisions of the bill included a ban on 
marijuana advertisement, allowing local governments to ban providers from opening storefront 
businesses, and granting schools the right to prohibit cardholders from participating in 
extracurricular activities.175   
SB423 passed through the House 78-17, and through the Senate 35-15.176 While this time 
there was more Democrat support (17 approval votes from Democrats in the House, 8 in the 
Senate), the vote was again largely partisan, with all but seven Republicans voting for the bill.177 
Governor Schweitzer’s allowed SB423 to become law without his signature, demonstrating his 
reluctance to support. He stated that while he did not like the fact that some of the marijuana 
businesses were going to have to shut down, overall reform was needed.178  
SB423 was deemed by many I-148 supporters as a “repeal in disguise,” and Montana’s 
medical marijuana industry spiraled after passage.179 The number of patients dropped to 9,000 in 
just a year, and providers decreased to less than 400.180 The restrictiveness of the law caused 
many to resort back to illegal means of acquiring marijuana as opposed to going through the state 
system.181 In recent years, Montana has been pushing back on the restrictions. Some of the bill’s 
restrictions were challenged in court, but the Montana Supreme Court ruled that most were 
constitutional. However, the court did strike down the provision that prohibited providers from 
receiving compensation.182 Ballot initiatives aimed at loosening restrictions have been 
introduced, but only one made it to the ballot. I-182 in 2016 passed, repealing the three-patient 
limit and continuing the lengthy debate over medical marijuana in the state.183  
 
Missouri Proposition C, 2008 
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 In 2008, an initiative called Proposition C was placed on the ballot in Missouri which 
attempted to increase renewable energy in the state. Efforts to create renewable energy standards 
via the state legislature had failed, so citizens of Missouri decided to take up the issue 
themselves.184 The signature requirement in Missouri for initiated statutes to reach the ballot is 
five percent of legal voters in any six of the eight congressional districts based on the totals of 
the last gubernatorial election. In 2008, the requirement was 94,060 signatures.185 After a 
successful signature recovery lawsuit was filed by supporters (which I address later in this case 
study), Proposition C supporters gained enough signatures and then turned toward convincing 
voters to support the initiated statute.186  
Proposition C created a renewable energy standard for businesses, requiring that utility 
companies generate or purchase electricity from renewable energy sources such as solar, wind, 
biomass and hydropower.187 This only impacted three large utility companies in the state. These 
companies were Kansas City Power and Light, AmerenUE, and Empire District Electric.188 The 
renewable energy sources were to equal percentages of retail sales by certain years. This 
included 2% by 2011, 5% by 2014, 10% by 2018, and 15% by 2021.189 Of the total renewable 
energy sources required to be sold, at least 2% were to be solar energy.  Also, any rate increase 
to consumers resulting from Proposition C could not be more than 1%.190 The official ballot 
question detailed that the estimated cost of the measure to state government entities would be 
$395,183, with no estimated direct costs to local government entities.191 
The initiative was approved by a 32.06 percentage point margin, with 1,777,500 
(66.03%) voting for, and 914,332 (33.97%) voting against.192 The campaign committee that 
supported Proposition C was called Missourians for Cleaner Cheaper Energy (MCCE). It 
included donations from the American Wind Energy Association (AWEA), the Missouri 
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Coalition for the Environment, the Missouri Votes Conservation, Renew Missouri, and the Sierra 
Club. The MCCE totaled $949,285 in expenditures during the election cycle in their support of 
the initiative.193 Supporters believed that Proposition C was a step toward moving Missouri to 
energy independence, and saw it as a chance to address the growing concern over climate 
change.194 They wanted to invest in the future of Missouri by localizing energy production and 
become less reliant on other states for coal. They argued that in addition to fighting climate 
change, this could create jobs and investment in rural areas.195 Kansas City Power and Light 
endorsed the committee, while the other two utility companies remained neutral in their 
support.196 Another notable group that supported the initiative was the League of Women Voters 
of Missouri. They stated that the coal produced is harmful, and that diversifying the electricity 
sources in the state would improve the electric system as a whole.197 
While AmerenUE did not officially take a side in the debate, spokesman Tim Fox said 
the company disagreed with government mandates and that they would prefer the market to 
dictate renewable energy efforts based on the rise and fall of prices.198 In addition to Fox’s 
comments, Empire District Electric said it would refuse to pay the solar rebates that would be 
required under the initiative.199  
Exemption Lawsuit and Supreme Court Ruling 
In response to Empire District Electric’s refusal they passed a law granting the company 
exemption from paying the solar rebates. This allowance was added to a bill the day before the 
legislative session ended that year and 11 days after Proposition C was determined eligible for 
the November ballot. It exempted any company from paying the installation subsidies, fees, or 
rebates to customers for solar energy systems, and eliminated the solar energy requirement from 
those companies as long as they met the overall 15% renewable energy requirement.200 A lawsuit 
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was filed by Renew Missouri, a supporting group of Proposition C. They alleged that this law 
was unconstitutional because it was a clear targeting of Proposition C, and that this was an 
example of tampering with a pending initiative. They also argued that the law was written so 
narrow as to essentially only apply to Empire District Electric that was also a violation of the 
Missouri Constitution.201 
This lawsuit was ruled on in 2013 by the Missouri Public Service Commission. The 
Commission found that the solar rebates would be an “extra compliance burden” on the electric 
company because they were already meeting the 15% renewable energy standard that 
Proposition C detailed.202 This allowed Empire District Electric to not pay solar rebates, unlike 
their two competitors. This led to AmerenUE and Kansas City Power and Light spending over 
$150 million to incentivize the use of solar energy from 2008-2014, while Empire District 
Electric installed almost no solar panels in their service territory.203  
An appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court was filed, and in 2015 it reversed the ruling. 
The court ruled 5-2 against Empire District Electric, stating that the PSC violated voter rights by 
preemptively overturning a part of a ballot initiative.204 This represented a big victory for the 
supporters of Proposition C, and proponents of direct democracy in the state. However, a key 
component of the court’s decision was that the legislature could still pass laws dealing with 
approved initiatives.205 This protected the series of events that had occurred right after 
Proposition C’s approval.  
Repeal Efforts After Approval  
 After Proposition C was approved by voters, the implementation of the statute proved 
difficult. Missouri’s Public Service Commission (PSC) had to calculate how much of the 
utilities' electricity would be generated from renewable energy sources and how much customers 
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could be billed. A year after Proposition C was passed, the PSC gave their rule to the Missouri 
Secretary of State.206 The PSC had turned the 1,000 word initiative into a 10,000 words of 
administrative rules detailing the implementation of Proposition C that was to take place in 
September 2010.207 This became a point of emphasis for the opposition.  
The PSC’s ruling came with immediate controversy from the state representatives, and 
the legislature began to disregard some of the rules. One of the points of contention was over the 
electric rates that consumers would be required to pay. The PSC ruled that the 1% limit would be 
capped at an average over the next 10 years. However, some calculations found that this could 
mean rates could increase by around 5% but be counted only as a 0.7% increase, because the 
increase would be averaged over time.208 Supporters of the measure argued that this would not be 
the case and that the 1% cap would promote renewable energy. Opponents stated that the details 
were too complicated and that the voters did not approve of those terms.209 
The largest point of dispute was the purchase location of the renewable energy. The PSC 
ruling and the writers of Proposition C wanted the energy to be bought in Missouri or the 
surrounding states so that Missouri consumers would receive the benefit.210 The utility 
companies disagreed with this stipulation based on the fact that prices could rise. They 
contended that they should be able to purchase the renewable energy on the open market, even if 
that meant the energy never ended up in Missouri.211 The Joint Commission on Administrative 
Rules disapproved of this language, and the state legislature began the process to reject that 
requirement as well.212  
On January 24th, 2011, the Missouri State Senate passed Republican-sponsored SCR1 29-
2 to reject this part of the PSC’s ruling.213 While Governor Jay Nixon did not directly approve of 
SCR1, his rendering of the resolution as “moot” meant that SCR1 became effective soon after.214 
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This meant that investor-owned utilities could subsidize projects in other states, therefore not 
necessarily delivering the power to Missourians. Lawmakers in Missouri argued that Proposition 
C language allowed for companies to go out-of-state for lower prices, and that the PCS was 
overstepping by implementing the rule.215  
Democrat-sponsored HB613 sought to reinstate some of those provisions by creating a 
new renewable energy act, but it never was taken up for a vote since their party was in the 
minority.216 A 2012 ballot measure was drafted by supporters of Proposition C with the goal of 
solving the dispute as well as increasing the amount of renewable energy produced, but it never 
made it to the ballot because of technical issues.217 The issue became stagnant, with both sides 
pushing for their cause with no real action taken.  
As Missouri continues to debate its renewable energy policy, this case study is important 
because it provides an example of how state legislatures can sometimes get involved before the 
initiative is voted on. This process demonstrated the numerous attempts that the legislature made 
to undermine Proposition C, and another example of a Republican-led legislature doing so. In the 
end, the initiative did not get entirely repealed, but the legislature was able to target parts of it to 
make it less effective than originally intended.  
 
Missouri Proposition B, 2010  
  Missouri Proposition B was placed on the ballot by way of 190,000 signatures.218 The 
signature requirement in Missouri for initiated statutes to reach the ballot is five percent of legal 
voters in any six of the eight congressional districts based on the totals of the last gubernatorial 
election. In 2010, the requirement was approximately 92,000. Proposition B put regulations on 
the dog breeding process. This included requirements for six main tenets of proper treatment of 
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the animals: sufficient food and clean water, veterinarian care, housing, and space to move 
freely, exercise, and rest.219 Each point was defined further to clarify the terms listed. Proponents 
wanted to clearly define the terms to dictate how breeders were to act so there would be a 
standard set for the state. According to the official statute: 
The purpose of this Act is to prohibit the cruel and inhumane treatment of dogs in puppy 
mills by requiring large-scale dog breeding operations to provide each dog under their 
care with basic food and water, adequate shelter from the elements, necessary veterinary 
care, adequate space to turn around and stretch his or her limbs, and regular exercise.220 
 
The initiative also put a 50-dog cap on the amount of dogs breeders could own. 
Furthermore, it detailed criminal codes for committing the crime of “puppy mill cruelty”—
making it a class C misdemeanor for the first offense, and a class A for repeat offenders.221 
It was approved by a slim margin of 3.18 percentage points, with 997,870 people voting 
in favor (51.59%), and 936,190 (48.41%) voting against.222 The supporters of the initiative raised 
just under $2 million in their efforts, with a large percentage coming from out-of-state groups. 
The funding became a point of contention for opponents of the bill, as they would argue that the 
proposal was not representing the views of Missourians and was being corrupted by outside 
forces such as the Humane Society of the United States.223 This coincided with an urban versus 
rural split in voting totals, as many farmers saw this as a direct attack on their livelihood and 
worried that it could signal future agricultural regulations.224 Notable supporters included the 
Humane Society of Missouri, the Humane Society of the United States, Missouri Alliance for 
Animal Legislation, and the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. Notable 
opposition included the American Kennel Club, the Missouri Veterinary Medical Association, 
the Missouri Federation of Animal Owners, the Missouri Farm Family Agricultural Alliance, 
Missouri Farm Bureau, and the Missouri Pork Producers Association.225  
Cronin 39 
 After its passage, the debate over repeal began. Supporters of the bill cited that the will of 
the voters should not be denied, however, repeal efforts were under way in the state legislature. 
Missouri SB4 and HB94 were both introduced in their respective chambers with the purpose of 
completely overturning the initiative. One was sponsored by a Republican and the other was 
sponsored by both a Democrat and a Republican. However both bills never made it out 
committee.226 Therefore, since complete repeal was not going to happen, the legislature began to 
look for ways to repeal parts of Proposition B.  
The Senate then put forth SB113, which completely removed the ownership cap. 
Advocates of this removal argued that Proposition B’s ownership cap only served to hurt those 
licensed breeders that followed the law, and that quantity of dogs did not have an impact on the 
quality of care.227 Proponents of Proposition B argued that this was a major portion of the bill 
that was gutted.228 The statute’s name was switched from “Puppy Mill Cruelty Act” to “Canine 
Cruelty Act,” and SB113 redefined and reworded some key phrases of the law.229 In addition to 
the name change, the terms that the bill altered broadened definitions to allow veterinarians to 
make judgement calls on requirements regarding rest, exercise, and periodic checkups. 
Furthermore, the definitions regarding food and water, housing, and space to move were 
broadened to align with “departmental regulations.”230 SB113 also removed the criminal codes 
that Proposition B had implemented for the crime of puppy mill cruelty. Therefore, under this 
new bill, the crime of “puppy mill cruelty” would cease to exist, and instead it was replaced with 
clarification of the criminal codes referring to violation of the existing Animal Care Facilities 
Act.231 The changes in these definitions and criminal codes were seen by proponents of 
Proposition B as essentially gutting the initiative, as they determined these new meanings were 
vague and therefore not going to be enforced properly.232 
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  The bill passed through the Missouri Senate by a vote of 20-14. The vote was largely 
partisan, as 7 of 8 Democrats and 7 of 26 Republicans in the Senate voted against SB113.233 
There was also an “emergency clause” introduced which would have made the bill effective 
within 90 days.234 Since the Missouri Constitution does not allow for referendum on legislation 
that has an emergency distinction, this clause would have prevented a referendum vote on 
SB113. This was seen by proponents of Proposition B as a clear attempt to silence their voices. 
Fortunately for supporters, an emergency clause required a two-thirds majority vote, so while the 
clause received an 18-15 vote in favor, the clause was ultimately not implemented.235 
All of the Senators who voted against the SB113 represented districts that approved 
Proposition B by over 60 percent. All but four Senators who supported the partial repeal bill 
represented districts that voted under 50 percent for Proposition B. These four Senators were 
Democrat Victor Callahan, Republican Scott Rupp, Republican Bob Dixon, and Republican Rob 
Schaaf.236 As the lone Democrat voting for the SB113, Callahan (who was the Senate Minority 
Leader as well) proclaimed that the bill still aligned with the voters’ original intent, and that a 
lack of “enforcement tools” was a large part of why Proposition B needed to be altered.237 Schaaf 
explained that his district misunderstood the impacts of the initiative, saying: "I don't believe 
people in my district wanted to put every dog breeder out of business."238 
In the House SB113 barely passed the 82-majority requirement needed, with it passing 
85-71.239 During the session, 13 members voted for SB113 even though their district approved 
Proposition B.240 Republican Representative Paul Curtman claimed he had “a lot of heartache” 
overlooking the will of his voters, as he did so along with six other Republicans in the St. Louis 
area who approved it.241 Republican Representative Kurt Bahr cited lack of funding mechanisms 
that would help enforce Proposition B.242 Democratic Representative Jamilah Nasheed justified 
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her vote against her district (which voted 81% in favor of Proposition B) by stating “it's always 
good to find some type of common-ground compromise.”243 Some speculated that the suburban 
Representatives that switched were enticed by promises by the Republican House leadership that 
included rural assistance on future bills such as charter schools.244 Regardless, the lawmakers’ 
statements did not cite that as a factor.  
Before signing SB113 into law, Democratic Governor Jay Nixon proposed a compromise 
that he hoped would bridge the gap between the voters’ wishes and the objections by the state 
legislature. This compromise was reached with major players on both sides, including Kathy 
Warnick of the Humane Society of Missouri, Karen Strange of the Missouri Federation of 
Animal Owners, Bob Baker of the Missouri Alliance for Animal Legislation, Barbara York of 
the Missouri Pet Breeders Association and Don Nikodim of Missouri Farmers Care.245 In doing 
so, Nixon started the process of a new piece of legislation, SB161, being considered to modify 
SB113. SB161 strengthened some of the language in SB113 that was seen as vague by 
Proposition B proponents, especially surrounding space parameters, exercise, and guidelines 
veterinarians had to follow when performing checkups or making recommendations.246 It also 
inserted more criminal codes to detail the crime of “canine cruelty” as a class C misdemeanor for 
first time offense, and a class A for a repeat offense. SB161 passed easily through the Missouri 
House (108-42) and Senate (24-10), and, unlike SB113, do so with an emergency clause.247 The 
emergency clause implemented the law almost immediately, and prevented any future 
referendum on the statute.248 Therefore, if proponents still had problems with the dog breeding 
process, another citizen initiative would have to be created.  
Ultimately the proponents of Proposition B were able to pass reforms to the breeding 
system in Missouri. However, they were only able to do so because of the Governor Nixon’s 
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actions that were focused on reaching a compromise. The state legislature made several clear 
attempts to alter Proposition B, and passed SB113, which many proponents of the initiative were 
dissatisfied with. So while Nixon effectively brought both sides to reluctantly agree on a 
revision, this did not end the debate over the initiative, and there were still Missouri residents 
that felt the titled “compromise” was rushed and demonstrated how the legislature was able to 
disregard the voters.249 However, this process did prove that the voters’ wishes could not totally 
be ignored by a legislature that largely wanted to, and highlighted some of the tactics and 
reasoning that legislatures utilize to attempt to undermine initiated statutes.  
 
South Dakota Measure 22, 2016 
 The most recent case study I examined is South Dakota’s Measure 22, in 2016. Plagued 
by two major ethics scandals in the two years prior, the voters of South Dakota decided to place 
an initiative on the ballot to deal with campaign finance reform.250 To get an initiative on the 
ballot in South Dakota, the amount of signatures must be equal to five percent of the number of 
votes cast in the most recent gubernatorial election.251 Since 277,248 people voted in the 2014 
governor’s race, supporters needed to collect around 13,870 signatures by the deadline.252 In the 
end, 25,216 signatures were collected, which submitted the initiated statute to the November 
ballot.253   
 Measure 22 was extremely detailed, reforming campaign finance and lobbying in several 
ways. The first was to alter the contribution limits. It lowered donation amounts to political 
action committees; political parties; and candidates for statewide, legislative, or county office.254 
PACs could not accept any contribution greater than $2,000 during a calendar year from a single 
source (the limit before had been $10,000). Political parties could not accept anything greater 
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than $5,000 (down from $10,000 as well).255 Candidates for governor could not accept $4,000 
from an individual person or political committee, or $40,000 from a political party, in a calendar 
year. For attorney general and lieutenant governor, those numbers were $2,000 for individual and 
$20,000 for a political party. For secretary of state, state auditor, state treasurer, commissioner of 
school and public lands, or public utilities commissioner, the limits were set at $1,000 
individually and $10,000 for a political party. The numbers for candidates for legislative and 
county officers were $750 individual and $5,000 from a political party.256 It also barred any 
candidate, PAC, or political party from accepting donations from any ballot question 
committee.257 Section 31 of the initiative limited lobbyists from donating over $100 in a calendar 
year, as well as banning being an intermediary for campaign gifts.258 In addition, certain state 
officials and high-level employees were prohibited from lobbying until two years after leaving 
the state government.259 
Other regulations in Measure 22 included disclosure and transparency details, as it 
required full disclosure of name and residence address to the recipient of the donation, no matter 
the entity donating.260 It also limited individual donations to $500 if the person did not disclose 
their occupation and current employer to the recipient, and inserted similar requirements for 
companies and committees that donate.261 Section 22 of the measure increased the amount of 
disclosure statements that were required from committees, parties, or candidates.262 Electronic 
standardization of disclosure was also accounted for in Sections 28-30.263 
  To go along with these changes, Measure 22 created an ethics commission entitled the 
South Dakota Ethics Commission. This ethics commission was to share responsibilities with the 
attorney general and secretary of state regarding enforcement of the new campaign finance 
regulations.264 The commission was to have five members (who could not be state employees, 
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elected officials, or lobbyists) to serve single six-year terms. No more than two members could 
be from the same political party.265 Their duties included the Democracy Credits Program 
implementation; issuing recommendations to minimize corruption and promote trust in the 
government; statement and record review; and investigative and enforcement duties.266   
  The final aspect of Measure 22 was the creation of a publicly funded campaign finance 
program, or a “democracy credit fund.”267 The program would send each registered voter in the 
state two $50 “democracy credits”, which voters could assign to the candidate(s) of their 
choosing. The democracy credits could only be assigned to candidates who had been certified as 
participating after the candidate filed with the ethics commission.268 This certification process 
included a minimum number of “qualified contributions” ranging from $25 to $200 depending 
on the office, as well as a demonstration that no unqualified contributions were received.269 
Limits for the amount of democracy credit funds that candidates could receive were also put in 
place for each office. This included caps on all candidates for particular offices if the total 
amount redeemed by all candidates exceeded a certain number.270 The ethics commission was to 
alter each of these numbers every other year based on the CPI of the Midwest Region.271  
 Measure 22 passed by a very slim margin of 3.26 percentage points, with 180,634 
(51.63%) in approval, and 169,199 (48.37%) opposed.272 There were two ballot question 
committees that supported Measure 22: South Dakotans for Ethics Reform, and South Dakotans 
for Integrity. In total, they received $1,834,653 in contributions.273 The top donor in support was 
a Massachusetts-based organization called Represent.Us, which seeks to pass anti-corruption 
initiatives at state and local levels of government.274 Other notable supporters were 
OurRevolution, and Democratic members of the state legislature (who were facing a large 
Republican majority at the time).275 
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These supporters of Measure 22 saw it as a way to fix a broken election system in the 
state, holding politicians and lobbyists accountable, and limiting the influence of big money. In 
their argument, they cited a study that ranked South Dakota as the eighth most corrupt state, and 
claimed that the lack of oversight on lobbying gifts was a problem that Measure 22 would 
address.276 They stated that lobbyists in opposition were only against the measure because they 
benefitted from the rigged system.277 They saw Measure 22 as a step in the right direction toward 
fixing the broken political system in the country, and how South Dakota could lead the charge of 
election reform nationwide.278 
Coinciding with the slim margin of victory was a large amount of opposition to Measure 
22. Defeat22.com was the lone ballot question committee against Measure22, and it raised over 
$600,000 in its efforts.279 The conservative group, Americans for Prosperity, was a top donor. 
Other notable opponents included the South Dakota Republican Party, South Dakota Chamber of 
Commerce & Industry, South Dakota Retailers, and South Dakota Farm Bureau.280 They argued 
that the taxpayers would be forced into subsidizing political campaign activity that people might 
not necessarily support, and that those funds could be put toward other projects to help the state. 
They also took issue with the donation disclosure requirement that Measure 22 implemented, as 
they saw this as a privacy violation which would put South Dakota residents as risk for 
harassment and intimidation based on the disclosure.281 Furthermore, the influence of outside 
groups like Represent.Us and OurRevolution was not received well because of their alleged 
unfamiliarity with the state and its people.282 
The repeal effort occurred almost immediately after Measure 22 was approved by voters, 
as a lawsuit was filed by Republican state legislators two weeks after election day. In the court 
case, Sixth Judicial Circuit Court Judge Mark Barnett ruled to put a hold on much of the 
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statute.283 While halting the implementation of the initiative, Barnett’s ruling essentially passed 
the burden of repeal onto the legislature, which on January 20, 2017, introduced HB1069. The 
bill’s sole purpose was to completely repeal Measure 22 and it passed through the House 54-13 
and through the Senate 27-8.284 No Democrat in either chamber voted in support of the bill, and 
only six Republican representatives combined voted against the bill. The bill also received the 
required two-third majority vote to pass with an “emergency” clause. This meant that HB1069 
would be implemented as soon as it passed, and that a veto referendum was off the table for 
voters.285 
Republican representatives supporting HB1069 made much of the same arguments as 
opponents had made during the campaign for the initiative, speaking out against outside 
influences in the state and privacy concerns. They claimed that the supporters of Measure 22 had 
been tricked into support by the external groups, and that a complete repeal was the best way to 
proceed. State Representative Larry Rhoden (R) cited the court’s decision to support his 
argument to start from scratch, and said that the ethics in the state were “impeccable.”286 Another 
criticism against the initiative was that it was too long. Speaker of the House Mark Mickelson 
alluded to the 13,000 words and 35 pages as being problematic, and stated that he believed 
representatives would resign if Measure 22 was not repealed.287 
Republican Governor Dennis Daugaard signed HB1069 into law on February 2, 2017. He 
stated that voters who supported Measure 22 were “hoodwinked by scam artists who grossly 
misrepresented these proposed measures.”288 However, he did sign other bills after passage 
through the state legislature that aimed at ethics reform. HB1073 limited lobbyist gifts and 
HB1076 established a government accountability board.289 These bills showed slight 
resemblance to some of the provisions that were in the initiative. In addition, HB1053 coded 
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protections to government employees who reported violations of abuse of funds or authority.290 
The final bill signed by the Governor was HB1165, which required annual updates of financial 
interest statements for any elected statewide or local official.291  
 Many supporters of the original Measure 22 saw the repeal as a horrendous threat toward 
direct democracy in the state, and evidence that the legislature did not have the voters’ interest in 
mind.292 However, despite the repeal of the initiative, the legislature did take up the issue of 
campaign finance reform with the bills passed and signed by Governor Daugaard. While that is a 
silver lining in the midst of a defeat for direct democracy in the state, the repeal of Measure 22 
proves that state legislatures are just as prepared as ever to go against the will of the voters when 
they do not agree with an initiated statute.  
 
Analysis 
After examining each case study, I was able to identify some common trends that 
occurred. In this section, I will identify them, and explain their importance to the my overall 




 Many of the case studies I observed contained criticism of outside influence by national 
groups. During the debate over Idaho’s Initiative 2, Montana’s I-148, Missouri’s 2010 
Proposition B, and South Dakota’s Measure 22, state legislators claimed that voters were 
influenced by various national groups, and that therefore the views of the voters were not 
represented properly. National groups in these case studies like U.S. Term Limits, the Humane 
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Society, and Represent.Us were accused by legislators of bringing the issue to the voters as 
opposed to having the voters create the conversation on their own. State representatives argued 
that outside influences were infiltrating the state, and that it was the legislature’s duty to seek for 
repeal.  
 As the literature review demonstrated, the past decade has seen an increase in both state 
and national interest group involvement in the initiative process. There is a legitimate case to be 
made that the original reasoning for adopting initiatives in state constitutions has been eroded. 
More money from large national interest groups makes it harder for smaller groups to make an 
impact, and it is understandable why some people see heavy outside influence as damaging to an 
initiative’s legitimacy. That being said, eliminating out-of-state influence does not necessarily 
decrease the lobbying efforts or money that these campaigns garner, as the interest groups within 
the state hold power and influence as well. This creates situations where the out-of-state 
influence can be exaggerated and misused to fulfill other objectives.  
The legislature’s use of the out-of-state argument does not always have to be grounded in 
truth. Just because interest group involvement is higher these days, does not mean that every case 
is severely impacted by it. Furthermore, as proven in the literature review, some of this influence 
can benefit the voters by making them more aware of the issues. By employing this line of 
reasoning, state legislators effectively can frame majority voter opinions as minority opinions. 
Despite the majority of voters approving a certain initiative, the legislators will say that it is only 
the case because of poor voter education on the issue. This is very similar to the original distrust 
of the initiative process when states were first writing the process into their constitutions. 
Lawmakers then and now cite a lack of deliberation and refinement in the initiative process, 
claiming that it goes against the Founders’ vision for lawmaking. This fear that minority groups 
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could abuse the direct democracy system has taken a new identity with the out-of-state argument. 
The lawmakers are able to present themselves as defending the state from being bought by 
organizations that do not represent the voters. By distancing support for the issue to those outside 
the state, they minimize the issue at hand. This seems to rationalize total or partial repeal for 
them, making the process easier to begin.  
The out-of-state argument paints the issue being debated as one that is not as important to 
the constituents as voters were led to believe. Regardless of the extent of the outside 
involvement, this expands on the trend of lawmakers questioning voter competence in regards to 
approving ballot initiatives they don’t support. In addition to the claims examined in the 
literature review such as difficult ballot language, lack of media coverage, lack of spending, and 
voter fatigue, lawmakers identify the influence of national groups as swaying voters in one 
direction or another. According to these representatives, instead of the voters raising the issue 
themselves and having educated opinions on it, the organizations are in control.  
The hypocrisy is evident, as legislators are being elected by those same voters. So when 
they try to discredit the voters by saying that “a small fraction voted” or that “the voters were 
bought”, they are applying a different standard than they apply to their own elections. 
Regardless, the representatives make it clear on numerous occasions that they believe they know 
the will of the voters better than the actual voters.  
In addition to minimizing the issue and raising questions of voter competence, this 
argument gives the legislature someone else to blame for an initiative they do not like beyond 
their constituents. This draws attention away from the fact that they are ignoring the will of the 
voters, and downplays a concern in their state. It allows the legislators to say that they are just 
defending their state’s integrity, and is clearly an effective tactic. Three out of four of the cases 
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(Idaho Initiative 2, Missouri’s 2010 Proposition B, and South Dakota’s Measure 22) in which 
this argument was employed saw voter opinion shift away from support. This demonstrates the 
out-of-state argument’s power and why it is very likely to be used if an approved ballot initiative 
attracts national attention, no matter the validity of the claims.  
   
Role of the Judiciary 
In the selections of the cases, I came across many ballot initiatives that were ultimately 
ruled unconstitutional by courts either before being placed on the ballot, or after passage. Since 
the role of the judiciary and ballot measures could be an entire research paper in itself and 
outside the scope of my research, I did not examine those cases. However, I think it is important 
to talk about how the judiciary was used in half of the cases that I ended up selecting, and how 
that impacts the initiative. The case studies demonstrate more tactics that state legislatures use to 
control the fate of ballot initiatives. These examples of legislatures claiming that approved 
initiatives are unconstitutional, and how sometimes legislators themselves can attempt illegal 
practices to stop initiatives, can be key components of a state legislature’s attempt to repeal.   
Just like how the legislature tries to blame outside groups for leading the voters astray, 
they can utilize other sources to try to repeal a ballot initiative before it gets to the State House or 
Senate. In two of my case studies, the state legislatures filed lawsuits claiming that the initiatives 
were unconstitutional. Both measures that were under question dealt with direct checks on the 
power of the state legislature (Idaho’s Initiative 2 and South Dakota’s Measure 22). This prompts 
a suggestion for future research about the relationship between checks on legislative power and 
the likelihood of judicial involvement.  
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Both of these lawsuits were filed early after the initiative’s passage, and were successful 
in delaying components of each piece of legislation. One takeaway from this is that it 
demonstrates the speed that the representatives want to begin repeal. When there is an issue that 
they want to repeal, the most immediate form of cancelling it from state law is to put it to the 
courts. Regarding Idaho’s Proposition 2, Rudeen v. Cenarrusa was initially a successful 
challenge; and the lawsuit against South Dakota’s Measure 22 resulted in a blockage. These 
validated the efforts of the legislature. While Idaho’s case was appealed to the Idaho Supreme 
Court and was ultimately ruled constitutional, it still allowed the legislature to slow the 
movement down and generate distrust within the public. With an increased likelihood that the 
court will side with the legislature or at least provide mixed results, representatives could be 
more inclined to turn toward the judicial system to fulfill initiative repeal. It can be quicker than 
the lawmaking process, and it provides a cover for the legislature to hide behind. While the 
burden of repeal fell to the state legislatures in both cases, the willingness to go to the courts 
unveils this tactic utilized by representatives in the repeal process.  
Another interesting aspect of the courts’ relationship with ballot alteration is that both 
sides can benefit from it, as it also can be utilized by proponents of the initiative. As stated 
above, the legislature often wants to accomplish repeal in a swift and silent manner, which leads 
them to claim unconstitutionality so the judicial system does the work for them. But as shown in 
the case of Missouri’s 2008 Proposition C, legislative repeal efforts can occur before the statute 
is voted on. The court was utilized in this situation to aid the initiative supporters, and protected 
the direct democracy process. While this was a win for the pro-initiative group, symbolizing that 
the court can favor both sides of the debate, it still allowed a path for the state congress to repeal 
the initiative later with legislation. Therefore, it seems the courts can seldom hurt the anti-
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initiative legislature, only providing a chance to succeed or move on to the next method of 
repeal. Future research should be done on the relationship between the legislature and the 
judiciary when repealing an initiative is an option. This would give greater insight into how the 
legislature can be impacted from sending an initiative to court, and how the courts view direct 
democracy today.  
 
First option: total repeal 
When it came down to the actual repeal process, the beginning legislation from the state 
legislatures centered primarily around complete repeal of the initiative. Not all were successful, 
but for every case study I analyzed, among the early drafted legislation there was at least one 
proposed bill that called for total repeal. This similarity gives insight to how some 
representatives view the issues that they disagree with. Instead of initially opting for compromise 
legislation, the first option seems to be a binary debate between keeping all of the statute or none 
of it. The reasons behind this should be a focus of future study, as political posturing, apathy 
toward compromise, or other factors could contribute toward a representative’s immediate 
suggestion of complete repeal of a voter-approved initiative. This trend seems to coincide with 
the increased partisanship that America has experienced during this 25 year time period. While 
these case studies and this issue is on a much smaller scale, it does not take away from the 
possibility that the nation’s lessened ability to compromise could play a part in the zero-sum 
game that is observed with regards to some ballot initiatives.  
This again relates to the lack of trust in voters. Now, as the literature review makes clear, 
there are many instances where the initiative process confuses or misrepresents voters, but 
factors like readability and oversaturation have an impact in many cases. Those factors do not 
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necessarily take away from voters caring about the issues that they vote on, or diminish their 
collective ruling on the issue. But instead of acknowledging that the issue at hand is one that 
voters care about and should be considered, some representatives do not give the voters’ 
preference any credibility. This demonstrates a lack of faith in voter judgement, which again is 
hypocritical.  
Beyond the questioning of voter knowledge and competency, the recommendation for 
complete repeal could demonstrate a doubt in the ability of voters to continue the support after 
the initiative. It takes a lot of effort and organization in many cases for initiatives to reach the 
ballot, so this could be seen as a good way to send initiative supporters back to square one. As 
the case studies showed, there are plenty of opportunities for the initiative process to be disrupted 
before the measure even reaches the ballot. And in most all of the cases, the issues are still being 
fought over to this day, with supporters of medical marijuana, or ethics reform in the states 
observed having problems getting their issues back on the ballots with similar support. Repeal 
puts initiative supporters on their heels, and therefore a complete repeal is not a bad place to start 
for some representatives.   
 
Rules of Repeal and Emergency Clause Usage 
 A surprising takeaway concerning these cases is the lack of rules surrounding legislative 
repeal. As the literature review details, 11 states have no restrictions on the legislative repeal 
process. It seems that there is no coincidence that all the states used for the case studies are a part 
of that total. The absence of restrictions on legislative power might give representatives more 
confidence to take part in the repeal of a statute they didn’t like compared to a representative in a 
state with some form of regulation. This is most demonstrated in the usage of emergency clauses.  
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Two of the five cases saw an emergency clause utilized to protect repeal legislation, and 
its impact potentially benefitted the legislature greatly. Not only does an emergency clause put a 
repeal resolution in effect, but in most cases does not allow for a referendum vote on the piece of 
legislation. This provides the legislature with an escape, and supporters of the initiative have to 
start a whole new campaign because the new legislation cannot be touched. In both cases where 
lawmakers used an emergency clause (Missouri’s 2010 Proposition B and South Dakota’s 
Measure 22), the debates over the initiatives were intense and involved a lot of negative political 
discourse. Both resolutions were seen by proponents of the initiatives as “gutting” the original 
statutes, and therefore were not universally supported by voters. The emergency clause prevented 
any action from being taken in either case, which provided the state legislatures safety from 
referendum on the controversial repeal legislation.  
These two cases demonstrate how emergency clauses hinder the opposition’s ability to 
respond in the way they would like, therefore making it harder to get the issue back to the voters’ 
priorities. Neither issue has been successfully added back onto the ballots in the states which 
shielded the repeal with the emergency clause. Since another run at the ballot takes its time and 
is a very expensive endeavor to do, this can decrease support. It also allows the legislature and 
other opponents to form new opposition campaigns. The emergency clause is likely to hurt the 
chances of proponents being able to successfully bring up the issue again in a timely manner and 
restricts the ability of the public to provide that check that is written in their state constitution. 
The referendum is a safety valve for the initiative, and is the ultimate check on the legislature, 
and taking the option away makes the emergency clause a powerful weapon for the state 
legislature and governor to utilize to clear an issue off the table.  
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The prevalence of emergency clauses on controversial initiative repeal legislation is a big 
takeaway from my research. It brings into questions the legislature’s ability to decide what an 
“emergency” is, since while the issues being discussed in these case studies were certainly 
important for the people of the states, they do not seem to qualify for the expected high standard 
it would take to pass a bill immediately without voter input. The use of it ignores compromise 
and bypasses direct democracy, all while demonstrating that legislatures will use the absence of 
rules to their advantage. The usage of emergency clauses should certainly be the subject of future 
research to determine how often abuse of this happens.  
 
Governor’s role and Partisan Power 
 The analysis of the case studies demonstrate the importance of the governor’s role in the 
repeal process. Since the governor’s signature is the last step in getting a complete or partial 
repeal passed, the actions of him or her can significantly impact the outcome. The governor is the 
party leader, and therefore gubernatorial decisions cannot be looked at without first examining 
the relationship with the legislature. In all of the case studies, the state legislatures were majority 
Republican— in many cases a heavy majority. Three cases included a Democratic governor, and 
two included a Republican. The governor responses were not common according to party, 
suggesting that it is a case-by-case decision when it comes to the governor’s action regarding 
initiatives.  
It seems the governor’s personal thoughts on the issue take precedent over that of his or 
her party in the legislature, unlike the legislature themselves. Each case study saw state 
representatives in both chambers vote along party lines when it came to initiative repeal. Most of 
the time their district’s voting outcomes did not matter, and instead party allegiance swayed their 
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vote. Similar to the initiative’s beginnings when the Republican party did not support the 
concept, the Democrats in these case studies often utilized the hesitancy to score political points. 
However, since most of the states that have the initiative process are Republican majorities, I do 
not believe that party has an impact on whether or not repeal is taken up in the first place. 
Instead, I believe it is much more likely to associate the lack of restrictions on legislative 
alteration with whether or not repeal moves forward and is achieved. Therefore, while party does 
not necessarily determine whether repeal is considered, allegiance to party supersedes following 
voters’ wishes when it comes to many state representatives.    
 Beyond the party and personal beliefs of the governor, the spotlight could also play a 
factor in the decision to sign off on repeal legislation or not. These situations become very public 
and polarized, as initiative supporters see repeal attempts as directly violating voter rights. With 
the increased attention, the governor could see this as an opportunity to win the voters’ support 
by publicly defending their rights to direct democracy. In three of the five case studies, the 
governor either vetoed a repeal or advocated for compromise legislation. In these scenarios, the 
governor portrayed himself as an advocate of the will of the voters, and made public statements 
on their behalf.  
The other two cases saw one non-committal governor, and one governor who was a stern 
advocate of repeal. The latter, South Dakota Governor Daugaard, cited the out-of-state argument 
as his reasoning for supporting repeal. However, he then signed other legislation that provided 
some of the reforms that supporters had been trying to address. Both could also be seen as a 
governor paying attention to the optics behind the decision to support or veto repeal. One 
governor did not want to formally take a stand on the issue, and the other publicly supported 
repeal but then made concessions under the radar. Therefore, it seems as though while the 
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relationship between governors and the repeal process is an extremely important one, it is 
heavily influenced by how the decision will politically impact public support for them.  
 
Conclusion 
In my literature review and case study analysis, I demonstrate how the debate over ballot 
initiatives and direct democracy began and how it has carried to today. In my analysis of five 
case studies I examined the timeline of repeal attempts in each case, identified trends, and was 
able to reach the following conclusions:  
When observing an approved ballot initiative, the prevalence of out-of-state interest 
group involvement on the issue is an area where the state legislature will often turn to make their 
case for repeal. The claim could be valid, as there is existing research to support that the 
initiative process has evolved to be used more by organizations, but could also be exaggerated by 
the legislature as rationale for repeal. In addition to the out-of-state argument, the state 
legislature will turn to the judiciary to make the first attempt at repeal. These early rationale can 
be seen as the representatives’ way of shifting focus away from themselves (and shifting blame 
away from the voters) to use other entities for repeal. As the repeal process continues, it is very 
likely that one of the first bills introduced during the state session will be centered around a 
complete initiative repeal as opposed to a partial one. If total repeal is ultimately not achieved, 
the regulations of legislative action have a direct impact on how repeal is considered, especially 
when it comes to emergency clause usage. The emergency clause is an important option that 
state legislatures and the governor will utilize to quickly pass repeal legislation and end current 
discussion over the issue. The state governor plays a large role in the process, but often makes a 
decision based on optics or his personal opinion regarding the issue. This is in contrast to the 
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legislature who will very likely vote along party lines regardless of their district’s support of the 
original initiative or not.  
This research was not without limitations. To start, data (both qualitative and 
quantitative) on state ballot initiatives is not easy to find. Some media websites do not archive 
their stories and a lot of information is not stored on government websites. In addition, the repeal 
process does not happen often, in part because there is a lot of attention paid to the initiative 
when repeal is brought up and the backlash can be fierce. Although, in doing research for this 
paper, it does seem like examples of legislative alteration are increasing (or at least becoming 
more publicized). Finally, while many variables were controlled for, there are going to be special 
circumstances in every case that are going to have an impact on the outcome. However, the five 
cases I selected provide a good base for analysis because they represent several states and issues. 
They allowed me to examine the repeal processes and observe commonalities in state legislature 
arguments and tactics. These observations provide a blueprint for how this process works.  
The initiative system is not perfect. Interest groups and increased spending have created 
systems where some people are seeing the process as inauthentic. Initiatives are also often not 
publicized well, leading to voter confusion and apathy on election day. Additionally, initiatives 
have a history of abusing minority groups, leading to some civil rights not being supported by 
direct democracy. Reforms of these issues are required for direct democracy to do what it is 
intended, and as the literature review demonstrated, there are many different opinions on how.  
But states with no legislative repeal laws must make changes too, because instances of 
unchecked legislative authority against the voters is a dangerous precedent. There has to be 
regulations on legislative alteration of initiatives, whether that is supermajority requirements, 
time restrictions, putting the issue back to voters, or a new method. This is certainly the case for 
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the 11 states that currently have none of these rules, as all of my case studies were part of the 11. 
One recommendation would be to cap out-of-state monetary donations to help ease concerns 
about how initiatives are being marketed and who the people feel is in charge. Another 
recommendation is mandatory judicial review of emergency clauses regarding initiative repeal. 
An emergency clause severely impacts initiative groups and is often not a valid emergency. 
There needs to be more oversight when legislatures vote or declare an emergency.  
These findings would also benefit from future research into each observed trend. One 
could examine the relationship between out-of-state interest groups and the in-state voters to see 
if the groups are misrepresenting the people or convincing them to support something they do 
not understand. Examining the judiciary’s role in the initiative process should also be explored 
further, specifically when it comes to initiatives that propose checks on legislative authority 
(such as Idaho’s Proposition 2 and South Dakota’s Measure 22). Future research should 
additionally center around emergency clauses and the rationale for their usage in initiative repeal 
settings, and how further oversight of that process, perhaps by the judiciary, would impact 
initiatives. With further in-depth analysis in these areas, the bridge between the two sides of the 
direct democracy debate could potentially come closer together. 
Direct democracy is still a topic of debate in contemporary politics, and it is more 
relevant than ever. Each state varies, and the benefits versus drawbacks of initiatives are still 
weighed back and forth with many of the same arguments as the early 20th century. The process 
has changed since its inception in the late 19th century, leading to more interest group 
involvement, increased cost, and targeting of vulnerable minority groups. Because of these 
problems, the people should not have unlimited decision-making powers. However, while the 
check on the voters can come through judicial means, legislative repeal is an important 
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occurrence we must pay attention to. Initiatives are a written part of state constitutions, and 
therefore should be considered a right of the voters of the state. Legislative repeal brings up 
questions as to how valued the voters’ opinion is, and how the legislatures’ ability to undermine 
that opinion can be abused. The trends I observed throughout my research demonstrate how 
repeal occurs and the impact of rules on the process. It also provides a baseline for future 
research to analyze each trend in more detail.  
As with many contemporary political issues, it is not easily solved, nor is it a binary 
solution. There needs to be a middle ground that allows voters to express themselves, while 
being confident that their representatives will respect that expression as long as it is 
constitutional. Despite the potential reforms that I have provided, I believe the one that matters 
the most is voter awareness. The initiative will only be as powerful as the voters’ participation 
and awareness in the process. The legislature is going to introduce laws restricting initiatives. 
Just recently Idaho’s state legislature passed initiative reform that would have made the state the 
most restrictive in the country (if the governor had not vetoed it).293 In scenarios like that, the 
people in those states have to know the stakes and how to respond. Just as direct democracy was 
crafted to give voters power, the responsibility is on the general public to make the necessary 
changes. Without increased awareness of the process by the people, the ultimate check on 






This map shows status of direct democracy in each state. Due to the methods of my research, 
states with direct initiatives were the only ones I observed. Therefore, while all include examples 




This map shows the states’ restrictions on legislative alteration. All of my case studies fell in the 
“no restriction” states.295  
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